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EXPERT POINT OF VIEW ON THE INVESTIGATION OF LARGE ACCIDENTS
Frédéric MASSON - Jean-Philippe PINEAU
INERIS - Parc Technologique Alata - B.P. 2 - 60550 VERNEUIL EN HALATTE - France
SUMMARY
Accidents are taken into account in risk assessment and shall be a basis for knowledge to be
considered for improving the safety level at the design and operation stages in various
industries and activities (transportation). Unfortunately, in many cases, detailed data are
difficult to be accessed. Lessons learnt from French accidents in plants and transportation will
be developed. In the detailed investigation of accidents, emphasis should be given on the need
to consider product(s), process, causes, circumstances, evolution (chain of events) and
consequences. Some examples will be developed on involved materials and products, on
accidental phenomenon, on the general design of a plant or transportation system, on the
reliability of safety related equipment, on procedures and on operator's influence.
INTRODUCTION
For long, very large accidents occurred in explosive factories. Later, accidents were reported
in flour mills (end of 18th century), in mines (coal dust and firedamp explosions), in chemical
plants, during the transportation of dangerous goods such as fertilizers, explosives ... or even
with very common substances such as fuels or grain.
In all cases, the consequences could be more or less extended : thermal effects from fire, toxic
gas and fire fumes releases, toxic spills in soil and water.
Especially, when the extension of damage was large and when people died, various enquiries
were undertaken :
• at the company level for a better understanding of the deficiencies of plant design and
operation including human factor, management and maintenance
• at competent authorities level for investigating the causes and for improving the existing
regulation
• at the insurance company level for defining the extent of the damages to be paid and for
reevaluating the insurance premium for a given plant, industrial field or technical system ...
Thus, investigations to be carried out have various goals, but the methodology could be the
same. This paper is given as an attempt to summarize the experience gained by INERIS (and
formerly CERCHAR) experts when accidents occurring with dangerous substances took place
in a variety of plants and systems.
In general, this experience is based on direct investigation and analysis of accidents. In this
paper, the logical steps to be used will first be given. Then, lessons learnt will be examplified.
Annual Conference « Risk analysis : opening the process », Paris, 11-14 octobre 1998.
INVESTIGATION OF ACCIDENTS
Logical steps for investigating and analysing an accident are the following
1. characteristics of the plant or system in which the accident occurred,
2. collection of data on damages, testimonies, analysis of samples,
3. definition of the operation when accident occurred,
4. consideration of all possible accident scenarios,
5. plausibility of a scenario.
Such steps will be illustrated in the oral presentation on the accident occurring at Blaye -
France - on August 20th, 1997 where a grain dust explosion, initiated in a grain silo, was at
the origin of 11 fatalities and of the collapse of silo cells.
Characteristics of the plant or system
Any information about the exact location of the plant (system) involved, other plants,
buildings and communication routes in the vicinity, the operation procedures when the
accident occurred, the types of products involved (if relevant), the presence and location of
operators or other persons, are to be collected. At this stage, preventive and protective
measures, existing regulations and codes of practices, emergency response should also be
reported. In many instances, emergency response data collected can give valuable information
about the development of an accident, the effectiveness of preventive and protective measures,
but can also explain some major modifications of the plant system before the investigation by
experts.
Data on damages and testimonies, sampling
Observation of damages is to be done as soon as possible, and if possible during the
development of the phenomenon.
Any injury and its consequences (immediate, mid- or long-term effects), fatalities and
ecological effects, are to be reported clearly including the locations and the exact dates.
Photos, video films, witnesses interviews, distribution of fall-outs and missiles, plumes
distribution after releases shall be collected to be considered later.
Samples shall be collected for further investigations about toxicity, combustibility,
explosivity ... even modified substances or construction materials can be interesting as a proof
of the fire development, thermal effects, involved materials ...
Definition of the operation of the system when accident occurred
A lot of accident investigations proved that the system was neither designed nor operated in
the conditions in which it was supposed to be. Any investigation must consider the exact
design and operation of the system, the maintenance, the training of operator, the application
of operating procedures and the management system, the possible interaction of third parties
(passengers in transport systems), the staff actions, the exact nature of products (if relevant),
the monitoring system (human or technical) and shall lead to a definition of the state of the
system (with existing uncertainties) and should be related to the other data collected.
All possible accident scenarios
At this stage, no consideration is to be paid to the likelihood of occurrence of the sequence of
events which constitute the possible accident scenarios.
The possible scenarios may be chosen from a preexisting list based on the possible
phenomena related to the use of hazardous substances, or to the materials present in buildings
or transportation vehicles. Mechanical effects from pressure vessels or containers under
pressure, from operation of plant, should also be considered as potential scenarios : collision,
derailment, sudden engulfment by fires or by fire fumes in a building. Only the main
characteristics of scenarios are to be taken into consideration. In a further step, the causes and
sequences of events related to these scenarios will be reported, checked and evaluated.
Some damages and testimonies can prove the likelihood of a scenario (bursting of a vessel or
building for explosion, thermal effects with flame for fire, visible colored smoke for releases).
At this stage, the collection of data from past accidents and incidents in the plant (system) or
in similar plants and/or with similar products, can induce some ideas about the sequence of
events.
For further investigations, an event tree for the considered damage or for a given phenomenon
can be established.
In such event trees, comparison with facts and damages, operation conditions, products
involved can focus the attention on the most logical and plausible scenarios.
Plausibility of a scenario
In explosion, the characteristics of products involved, the modelling of the phenomenon for
defining the pressure levels are to be considered. In other cases, the thermal effects for fires,
the gas or liquid releases flow calculations, and the dispersion effects can explain the extent of
damages.
When results of tests or modelling are obtained, they shall be compared with data collected.
Such an analysis is examplified in the summary report of Blaye accident (see annex 1).
The reports of such investigations shall be made available to a large public and especially
stored in databases for further use by systems designers and operators, insurers, competent
authorities.
Such public databases are in existence and are described in a Directory issued in 1997 by
European Safety, Reliability and Data Association - ESReDA -.
An expert group of this organisation dealing with "Accident Analysis" is currently preparing a
guidance document to be issued in 1999 for the improvement of the quality of data and will
especially consider the role of the database operator and how to structure the database and to
collect, record and validate data.
LESSONS LEARNT FROM ACCIDENTS
INERIS experts were directly involved in the following field investigations :
• an unconfmed vapour cloud explosion (UVCE) in a fuel depot at St Herblain,
October 7, 1991 (J.F. Lechaudel et al., 1995) with one fatality and extensive damages
outside the depot premises
• another major UVCE in the TOTAL refinery's fluid catalytic cracking unit at La Mède
(November 9,1992) (P. Michaelis et al., 1995) with 6 fatalities and 2 billion francs damage
• confined explosion in a grain silo, Blaye in 1997, 11 fatalities, 1 injured and extensive
damages (F. Masson, 1998)
• confined gas explosion in a plant connected to a flare stack (J.F. Lechaudel et al., 1998)
• a fire in a fuel depot at St Ouen, June 1991, with 15 fire fighters injured and the evacuation
of 1.000 persons
• ammoniac accident release (30 tons) in a chemical plant at Mazingarbe when unloading a
railtank (December 16, 1994) (J.F. Lechaudel et al., 1998)
• fire and explosion following derailment of unleaded fuel railtanks on August 13, 1993 in
La Voulte. 1.900 persons evacuated
• fire in a NPK ternary fertilizer storage, Nantes, in 1987. 30.000 persons evacuated.
Most of these investigations were carried out at the request of French competent authorities,
the rest directly for industrial firms.
Further details on other accidents investigated, either in chemical industries or in other
industries are given elsewhere (J.P. Pineau et al., 1993).
From these accidents, many lessons can be drawn, either for the general design or the
operation of the system, or on the efficacy of existing safety measures.
These field investigations allowed to draw some general assumptions.
The accidents at St Herblain (fuel depot) and La Mède (refinery) pointed out the influence of
the location of ignition sources when flammable gases can be released and the absolute
requisite of the definition of dangerous areas for choosing the adapted equipment.
The fire in the St Ouen fuel depot emphasized the role of repair and maintenance works and
some difficulties for closing valves during fire fighting, mainly in relationship with the
design.
A grain dust explosion as in Blaye, a rare occurrence with so extended damages and fatalities
is dealing with dust, a by-product in grain elevators. The extension of fatalities is related to
the location of offices and to the design of confined premises in which the explosion can
propagate.
The case of Nantes accident (fertilizers) is an illustration of a dangerous release of toxic fumes
from a fire and the necessary emphasis to be paid to proper distribution of goods in storages
and use of adapted fire fighting methods.
The railtank accident in La Voulte is dealing with a transportation accident for which the
geographical location of the occurrence can play a major role : explosion in a sewage system
and pollution of the drinking water system.
The emission of toxic gases as in Mazingarbe and the explosion in a plant connected to a flare
stack could be considered as an illustration of accidents in which the use of safety measures
was not analyzed regarding their functionality and dependability : safety systems for avoiding
releases in the first case and the running of utilities in the second case had poor reliability.
Within the cases of these accidents, only technical aspects were dealt with either for the
design stage or for the operation stages in which safety measures are to be used. An
improvement of the situation can only be obtained if the same level of experience is shared
between manufacturers and designers of equipment and the users. This could be based on a
risk analysis in which the intended use of the equipment (generally included in a process or a
plant) is adequately defined, as well as the potential accidental scenarios with the hazardous
zones concerned and the use of safety measures (including their reliability).
But more emphasis should be paid on organisational measures (safety management) and
human behaviour.
All these aspects being dealt with, they could be introduced in a database in which a summary
report can be the basis for further use.
CONCLUSION
The analysis of very large accident must follow logical steps :
• an understanding of intended use and operation procedures when the accident occurs
• identification of all possible scenarios considering data on damage, testimonies, analysis of
samples
• choosing the plausible one considering all data collected in relationship with testing
modelling of events and phenomena.
The lessons learnt are also to be shared to all interested people through publicly accessible
databases.
The lessons learnt are related either to the lack of knowledge on accidental phenomena and
their consideration at the design stage of the plant. Operating procesures (including
maintenance and repair works) and organisations measures and human behaviour are also very
important aspects.
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Annex 1
Grain dust explosion in a silo
August 20 th, 1997
Type of plant
In a grain elevator (port silo along the Gironde river), under operation (unloading grain from
lorries and moving grain from a cell to another storage area through a conveyor belt), an
explosion occurred.
Facts on accident
The explosion induced the collapse of more than half the 44 silos cells (30 m high and 6 m in
diameter, storing wheat, barley and maize), and of the working tower, with blow out of debris
100 m around ; 11 people were killed and 1 injured. Minor damages to neighbouring houses
occurred : glass breakages.
Immediate cause
The immediate cause of this explosion is still unknown, but reports from witnesses proved
that the explosion initiated at the top of the working tower. Due to the presence of dust in the
centralised dust collection system, it is supposed that the explosion initiated there and
propagated to some cells, the working tower and other parts of the silo
The investigation proved no evidence of self heating of stored grain, excluding the formation
of an explosive atmosphere of pyrolysed gas from grain stored in cells.
Extended damage does not allow to define the nature and location of the ignition source of
grain dust air mixture. Friction through mechanical shocks in the ventilator upstream of the
bag filters (centialised dust collection system), or self ignition in the dust collection chamber
are suspected. The equipment was located in the upper storeys of the working tower.
Underlying causes
The propagation of the explosion in concrete confined structures was at the origin of the
collapse of concrete structures. Location of offices in these concrete premises, too close to silo
cells, was an aggravating factor and the cause of fatalities of people not directly related to the
operation of the silo.
Dust was collected through bag filters in a dust chamber. The non enclosed bags were located
at the top of the working tower. Such a device should be avoided.
Recommendation
Revision of the French legislation on grain storage (dated 1983) which will imply a risk
assessment.

